The effect of primes (i.e., incidental cues) on human behavior has become controversial. Early studies reported counterintuitive findings, suggesting that primes can shape a wide range of human behaviors. Recently, several studies failed to replicate some earlier priming results, raising doubts about the reliability of those effects. We present a within-subjects procedure for priming behavior, in which participants decide whether to bet or pass on each trial of a gambling game. We report 6 replications (N ϭ 988) showing that primes consistently affected gambling decisions when the decision was uncertain. Decisions were influenced by primes presented visibly, with a warning to ignore the primes (Experiments 1 through 3) and with subliminally presented masked primes (Experiment 4). Using a process dissociation procedure, we found evidence that primes influenced responses through both automatic and controlled processes (Experiments 5 and 6). Results provide evidence that primes can reliably affect behavior, under at least some conditions, without intention. The findings suggest that the psychological question of whether behavior priming effects are real should be separated from methodological issues affecting how easily particular experimental designs will replicate.
The effects of primes on human behavior are attracting attention, again. The first time was in the 1990s when researchers reported some of the earliest behavior priming effects. Exposing research participants to words related to rudeness, for example, made them more likely to interrupt the experimenter; exposing them to words related to the elderly slowed their walking speed; and exposing them to photos of African Americans increased aggressive behavior (Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996) . In related research, participants correctly answered more general knowledge questions after thinking about the qualities of professors than after thinking about the qualities of soccer hooligans (Dijksterhuis & van Knippenberg, 1998) . Subsequently, hundreds of studies reported evidence that incidental exposure to words, pictures, or other cues could influence a wide range of behaviors, including pro-social behavior (Macrae & Johnston, 1998; Shariff & Norenzayan, 2007) , consumer choices (e.g., Berger & Fitzsimons, 2008) , and voting decisions (Berger, Meredith, & Wheeler, 2008) . In follow-up questionnaires, subjects in these studies generally showed no awareness that their behaviors had been influenced by the primes.
Earlier research had established that presenting words as primes could facilitate later memory and perceptual processing of those same objects (e.g., Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Tulving & Schacter, 1990) and semantically related stimuli (e.g., Meyer & Schvaneveldt, 1971; Neely, 1977) . The effects of primes on higher level behaviors like social interactions and decision making, however, suggested that primes might have effects more powerful than previously acknowledged. Behavior priming effects are important for psychological theory because they provide evidence about the influence of automatic or unconscious processes on behavior. Many dual-process theories have drawn on behavior priming effects to explain how automatic and controlled processes relate to each other and how they interact to drive behavior (e.g., Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Kahneman, 2011; Sherman, Gawronski, & Trope, 2014) . Recently, however, behavior priming is attracting attention for a different reason. Several articles have reported failures to replicate influential priming studies. For example, Harris, Coburn, Rohrer, and Pashler (2013) reported two experiments that found no effects of achievement primes on test performance, failing to replicate the results of Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, Barndollar, and Trötschel (2001) . In another article, Shanks and colleagues (2013) reported nine experiments that failed to replicate the findings of Dijksterhuis and van Knippenberg (1998) , which indicated that priming subjects with professor versus soccer hooligan affected performance in answering general knowledge questions.
When replications find different results than an original study, there are many possible reasons. In some cases, the replication study may not follow the exact protocol of the original study. Even when the procedure is replicated exactly, two different samples may produce different estimates of effect size due to sampling variability, even if they are drawn from a population with the same true effect (Stanley & Spence, 2014) . Another reason for differences across studies is that unidentified moderating variables may differ between studies. In such cases, establishing the role of the moderating variable requires specifying a priori theoretical predictions. Several relatively new theoretical frameworks have recently made progress toward this goal (Cesario, Plaks, Hagiwara, Navarrete, & Higgins, 2010; Loersch & Payne, 2011; Schröder & Thagard, 2013; Wheeler, Demarree, & Petty, 2007; see Molden, 2014a for a review). Finally, low statistical power is a major problem for many original and replication studies. Underpowered studies result in effect size estimates with large confidence intervals, raising the risk of both false positives and false negatives (for an in-depth discussion of replication issues, see the November 2012 special issue of Perspectives on Psychological Science).
Despite these complications, it seems that the most common interpretation of a null replication is that the effects in question are not real. For example, after considering and rejecting several procedural and statistical explanations for why their results may have differed from the original study, Harris and colleagues, (2013) concluded, "Another obvious possibility is that the highperformance-goal prime results of Bargh et al. are invalid, and may be due, for example, to Type 1 errors" (p. 6). Similarly, Pashler, Coburn, and Harris (2012) concluded, "Another possibility, however, is that the Williams and Bargh results are simply not valid, representing, for example Type 1 errors" (p. 6). And Shanks and colleagues (2013) concluded, "A fifth and final possibility is that some or all of the published results on intelligence priming were false positives" (p. 7).
Although scholarly articles like the aforementioned have made efforts to consider alternative methodological and statistical explanations, the message understood by the popular press is often less nuanced. A Chronicle of Higher Education blog, for example, described a replication project by saying,
The project is part of Open Science Framework, a group interested in scientific values, and its stated mission is to 'estimate the reproducibility of a sample of studies from the scientific literature.' This is a more polite way of saying 'We want to see how much of what gets published turns out to be bunk.' (Bartlett, 2012) Despite the complexities of debates over replications, many readers see nonsignificant replication attempts and read, "bunk."
A meta-analysis of priming studies that included words as primes and behavioral dependent variables (Weingarten et al., 2016) found a small but significant average effect (d ϭ .35; 95% CI [.29, .41] ). Using several methods for estimating publication bias (e.g., trim-and-fill analysis, funnel plot, and p curve), the meta-analysis not only found evidence for the existence of publication bias, but also concluded that publication bias alone cannot explain the average effects. These analyses are important, but they are unlikely to change the minds of critics because it is always possible that the methods insufficiently corrected for publication bias. We believe that to better understand the effects of primes on higher level human behavior, it is important to be clear about the phenomena in question, and to better separate psychological questions regarding how primes influence behavior from the methods used to study these questions.
There Is No Such Thing as "Social Priming"
Many readers of this literature have interpreted failures to replicate experimental effects within specific paradigms as evidence against a broad category of phenomena that have collectively been labeled social priming. But, what does social priming mean? There is not, in principle, any meaningful distinction between semantic activation of concepts that have to do with other people and concepts that do not. The original use of the term appears to be traceable to an open letter by Daniel Kahneman, sent to a number of social psychology researchers. The letter expressed concern over some then-recent studies that had failed to replicate previously published priming effects (described in the preceding text). It was addressed to "a collection of people who were described to me . . . as students of social priming" (Kahneman, 2012) . The term was not defined in the letter, however it seems to be used to refer to the researchers who conduct studies (i.e., social psychologists) rather than to a phenomenon itself. The term social priming was then repeated in popular press coverage of the exchange (e.g., Yong, 2012) and in social media discussions (e.g., Zwaan, 2013; Neuroskeptic, 2015) . This conceptual confusion has led to doubts about entire areas of research based on a handful of specific studies that failed to replicate particular experimental paradigms.
A term based on the disciplinary affiliations of researchers rather than a description of the phenomenon in question is clearly not useful for advancing scholarly understanding of the topic. The term does not refer to any meaningful class of phenomena that can be grouped together in a coherent way. We argue that there is no such thing as social priming-not because that term refers to an unreliable phenomenon, but because it is conceptually incoherent. The conceptual confusion inherent in that term has led many commentators to interpret a handful of specific studies with null results as evidence against a broad area of research comprising multiple phenomena and multiple methods (Kahneman, 2012; Yong, 2012) .
Several authors have recently attempted to clarify the empirical phenomena of interest in this debate, with a relatively high degree of consensus. Molden (2014b) suggested that the criteria are (1) stimulation of a mental representation that influences subsequent evaluations, judgments, or actions; and (2) this effect occurs either without awareness of the prime's influence or without intention to utilize the prime stimulus (although not necessarily without awareness of the stimulus presentation). Similarly, Doyen, Klein, Simons, and Cleeremans (2014) suggested that the features common across procedures include (1) experimenters presenting a prime stimulus, (2) the prime activating an internal representation, (3) the activated representation influencing other representations (this distinguishes semantic or associative priming from repetition priming), and (4) activated representations leading to changes in behavior. Finally, Ferguson and Mann (2014) summarized the issue succinctly:
We suspect that what some people mean when they talk about social priming is behavioral or goal priming. Behavioral priming occurs when incidental processing of a cue changes behavior . . . , whereas goal priming occurs when exposure to some cue shifts one's goal pursuit (which is usually measured via behavior . . .). (p. 37) Consistent with these descriptions, we are concerned with unintended effects of primes on behavior in the present article. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
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Critics of behavior priming have often contrasted it with the robustness of semantic priming (e.g., Pashler, Coburn, & Harris, 2012; Shanks et al., 2013) . In semantic priming, presentation of a word (e.g., DOCTOR) facilitates faster responding to a related word (e.g., NURSE) in lexical decision, naming, or perceptual identification tasks (e.g., Meyer & Schvaneveldt, 1971; Schvaneveldt & McDonald, 1981) . Semantic priming refers to the effects of incidental primes on the processing of subsequent information. The present article, in contrast, concerns whether incidentally processed stimuli can reliably affect not only the processing of subsequent information (as in semantic priming) but also a person's actions and decisions (as in behavior priming).
Studies of semantic priming and behavior priming typically differ in many ways. One key difference, on which we focus here, is that behavior priming studies typically use a between-subjects design in which one group of participants receives one kind of prime and another group receives a different kind of prime. Semantic priming, in contrast, uses within-subjects designs in which each subject responds to all primeϪtarget combinations over dozens or hundreds of trials.
Many within-subjects designs have demonstrated robust priming effects in evaluation or judgment of stimuli. Briefly presented prime stimuli reliably affect the speed with which target stimuli are evaluated, as in evaluative priming tasks (Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995; Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986) ; the likelihood of positively evaluating an ambiguous target image, as in the affect misattribution procedure (Payne, Cheng, Govorun, & Stewart, 2005) ; the likelihood of misidentifying harmless items as weapons (Correll, Park, Judd, & Wittenbrink, 2002; Payne, 2001) ; and the likelihood of perceiving trait attributes in ambiguous faces (Krieglmeyer & Sherman, 2012) . Meta-analytic evidence suggests these effects are highly replicable (Cameron, BrownIannuzzi, & Payne, 2012) . These effects have played little role in recent debates over the replicability of "social priming" or "behavioral priming" effects. This may be because, like semantic priming, these paradigms focus on processing of subsequent stimuli rather than on decisions or actions that are traditionally considered to be "behaviors" (see Ferguson & Mann, 2014) .
In our view, the emphasis on the replicability of early priming effects conflates the important theoretical question with methodological aspects of specific studies. The theoretical question is whether, and how, primes affect behavior. Methodological issues include the use of between-subjects manipulations, and the use of only one or a few observations per participant for the dependent variable. Both between-subjects designs and "single shot" measurements lead to low statistical power. Studies using such designs can be expected to generate data with large amounts of error variance and, as a result, are likely to be difficult to replicate. Critically, these methodological weaknesses would reduce replicability regardless of the psychological phenomenon in question. So, we must ask, do reported failures to replicate behavior priming studies tell us something about the effects of primes on human behavior? Or do they tell us about the effects of particular experimental design factors on error variance?
In the reported experiments, we aimed to take a step toward separating the psychological question from the methodological questions. To do so, we tested whether a high-powered withinsubjects design, similar to those used to study semantic priming, would produce a robust demonstration of behavior priming. If primes reliably affect behavior when high-powered experimental designs are used, then it shifts the debate in important ways. It would demonstrate, most simply, that primes can affect subsequent behavior, not just the ability to process subsequent stimuli. Such findings, if replicated, would challenge one of the major possible conclusions in this debate, namely, that priming effects on behavior are illusory. Research efforts may then turn productively toward systematically identifying the conditions under which primes do (and do not) influence behavior. We consider in the general discussion some other ways that behavior priming and semantic priming studies may differ, and suggest additional steps for future research to systematically understand the similarities, differences, and boundary conditions.
Theoretical Rationale for the Present Approach
Rather than replicating previous studies, we start from the current state of knowledge about how and why primes are likely to affect behavior. We designed a simple gambling task to capture the essential phenomenon of interest, in which a prime stimulus may unintentionally influence a subsequent behavior. We based our predictions on the Situated Inference Model (Loersch & Payne, 2011 , 2014 . The model claims that primes affect behavior when the primes make associated thoughts or feelings more accessible, and that accessible information is misattributed to one's own response to the behavioral options afforded by the situation. For example, if a prime makes a subject think about betting and she mistakenly thinks that mental content is self-generated, then she is more likely to bet. This misattribution or source confusion has an important relationship to the lack of awareness that is of interest in behavior priming effects. In behavior priming studies, it is awareness of the influence of the primes on behavior that is of interest, rather than awareness of the prime stimuli themselves. Researchers sometimes use masked presentation of primes because subjects cannot be aware of a prime's influence if they cannot consciously identify the prime. But in such cases, masked presentation is merely a means for ensuring that subjects are unaware of the primes' influence on their behavior (Molden, 2014b) . If subjects misattribute a primed thought to their own self-generated thoughts, then this misattribution also represents a kind of unawareness, because the person mistakenly experiences influences of the primes for self-generated influences.
Critically, because the Situated Inference Model argues that primes influence behavior when associations activated by the primes are misattributed to one's own responses, we predict that the primes will influence behavior when the player's hand is neither very strong nor very weak. Only when the hand is moderate does the potential exist to confuse primed thoughts for one's own thoughts. In such cases, participants might think about betting, for example, either because they generated the thought to bet, or because the prime activated a thought to bet. If the prime activated the thought to bet when the player's hand is very weak, it would be more obvious that the thought must have originated with the prime. We therefore hypothesized that primes would affect behavior when the player's hand was moderately strong but not when the hand was very strong or very weak. We examined this possibility in a series of six replications, using both laboratory and Internet samples. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
Method for Experiments 1, 2, and 3
The first three experiments are close replications and so are described together. In each experiment, participants played a simple card game (inspired by Black Jack) against the computer. On each trial, the participant and the computer were each dealt two playing cards (see Figure 1 ). Participants were asked to look at their two cards and, based on their additive value, choose whether to bet or pass. Hand value was determined by the numeric value of the cards, with face cards worth 10 and Aces worth 11. If the participants' hand total was higher than the computer's (not shown to the participant), they won 5 points. If the participants' hand total was less than the computer's, they lost 5 points. No points were awarded or lost if the participant passed. Participants were instructed to try to win as many points as possible.
Before participants were able to indicate their choice, a prime word was flashed on the screen. Participants were told that the word was a "distractor" that was not informative, and that they should "try not to let this word influence your decisions." Previous research has found that when primes and targets are presented in quick succession, participants have difficulty disentangling their semantic (Gawronski, Deutsch, & Seidel, 2005; Imhoff, Schmidt, Bernhardt, Dierksmeier, & Banse, 2011; Sava et al., 2012) and affective (Payne et al., 2005; Gawronski & Ye, 2014) responses to the two items even when the primes are plainly visible.
The prime word was randomly chosen from a list of words related to betting or passing (specific stimuli used are described in the procedure sections of each experiment). On each trial, the participant's hand was shown for 600 ms, followed by a 150-ms blank screen. Next, a randomly selected prime was presented for 300 ms, followed by a 100-ms blank screen. Participants were then asked to indicate whether they wanted to bet or pass by clicking one of two options with a computer mouse. This screen was displayed until a decision was made. Finally, the participants were presented with feedback: whether they won 5 points, lost 5 points, or did not lose or gain any points. Hand totals ranged from 4 to 21. The hand value and prime type were randomly determined on each trial. At the end of all trials, participants' total point amount was displayed.
Because we did not expect any variability for extremely high and low hands, we decided a priori to designate the lowest (Hands 4 -7) and the highest (Hands 18 -21) as filler trials in which the outcome was always win (for the high hands) or lose (for the low hands). We considered the intermediate hands to be the critical trials. On critical trials the outcome was randomly determined such that if participants bet, then they would be equally likely to win or lose points. This allowed the reward experienced by participants to be independent of the primes and hands, preventing contingency learning from influencing results. The design of each study was 2 (prime: bet or pass) ϫ 10 (hand value) with both factors within-subjects.
Note that the individual data points within each of these experiments includes only three observations per subject, so effects at specific hand levels should be interpreted with caution. Thus, the overall pattern of responses is more informative than specific within-hand comparisons, which vary across studies due to the small number of observations. Following the presentation of the six individual studies, we present the aggregated results which are less vulnerable to such variance.
Procedure
Experiment 1. Participants were 153 college students (42 male, 111 female; M age ϭ 18.69 years, SD age ϭ .89). The game included 80 trials (60 critical and 20 noncritical), with hand value and prime type randomly determined on a trial-by-trial basis. The behavioral primes were randomly selected from a set of six words, three related to betting (bet, gamble, or wager) and three related to passing (pass, fold, or stay). After completing the priming task, participants were asked how often they played cards, gambled while playing cards, and played Black Jack. Then participants completed a series of demographic questions (age, gender, and race/ethnicity). These variables did not moderate our results and will not be discussed further. No participants were excluded from analyses.
Experiment 2. Participants were 219 Amazon Mechanical Turk users (118 male, 94 female, 6 nonresponses; M age ϭ 34.45 years, SD age ϭ 12.07). One participant pressed only a single response key throughout the entire priming task and was excluded from the analyses. In this version of the game we dropped the primes "bet" and "pass" because these words were used to label the response options. We wanted to ensure that the effect replicated without priming the response labels themselves. The game included 90 total trials (80 critical and 10 noncritical). All other aspects of the procedure were identical to Experiment 1. Experiment 3. Participants were 115 Amazon Mechanical Turk users (70 male, 45 female; M age ϭ 33.94 years, SD age ϭ 11.55). Two participants pressed one response throughout the entire priming task and were excluded from the analyses. The procedure was identical to that used in Experiment 2.
Results
We hypothesized that primes would influence betting behavior when the hand value was moderate but not when it was high or low. To test this hypothesis, we analyzed the proportion of "bet" decisions for each hand and prime condition using a repeatedmeasures analysis of variance (ANOVA). This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
proportion of "bet" decisions as a function of hand value and prime type. In Experiment 1, there was a main effect of prime such that subjects were significantly more likely to bet when they were primed with bet-related words (M ϭ .48, SE ϭ .02) than when they were primed with pass-related words (M ϭ .46, SE ϭ .01), F(1, 152) ϭ 3.96, p ϭ .048, p 2 ϭ .03. There was also a main effect of hand value such that as hand value increased participants were more likely to bet, F(9, 1368) ϭ 357.31, p Ͻ .001, p 2 ϭ .70. Importantly, these main effects were qualified by the predicted interaction between prime and hand value, F(9, 1368) ϭ 4.60, p Ͻ .001, p 2 ϭ .03. Consistent with our hypothesis, the pattern suggests that participants were more likely to respond in primeconsistent ways when hand values were ambiguous.
We obtained the same general pattern of results for Experiment 2 (see Figure 3) . Again, there was a main effect of prime, such that when people were primed with bet-related words they were significantly more likely to bet (M ϭ .49, SE ϭ .015) than when they were primed with pass related words (M ϭ .45, SE ϭ .013), F(1, 217) ϭ 17.67, p Ͻ .001, p 2 ϭ .08. There was also a main effect of hand value, such that participants were more likely to bet as their hand value increased, F(9, 1953) ϭ 247.33, p Ͻ .001, p 2 ϭ .53. As before, these main effects were qualified by the predicted interaction between prime and hand value, F(9, 1953) ϭ 2.74, p ϭ .003, p 2 ϭ .01. These results were replicated in Experiment 3. There was a main effect of prime, such that subjects were significantly more likely to bet when primed with bet-related words (M ϭ .53, SE ϭ .018) than when primed with pass-related words (M ϭ .51, SE ϭ .018), F(1, 112) ϭ 6.11, p ϭ .02, p 2 ϭ .05. There was also a main effect of hand value, such that as hand value increased participants were more likely to bet, F(9, 1008) ϭ 140.39, p Ͻ .001, p 2 ϭ .56. Again, these main effects were qualified by the predicted interaction between prime and hand value, F(9, 1008) ϭ 2.40, p ϭ .01, p 2 ϭ .02 (see Figure 4 ).
Experiment 4: Replication With Masked Prime Stimuli
Experiments 1 through 3 instructed participants to ignore the primes and found effects of the primes despite those instructions, thereby suggesting that the effect was unintended. This approach is similar to the logic of the Stroop color naming task, in which participants are instructed to read the font color of words and to ignore their meaning. Nonetheless, performance typically shows that word meaning causes interference, suggesting involuntary reading. Another approach to demonstrating that participants are not deliberately using primes to inform behavior is to present the primes briefly and with masking stimuli to limit subjects' conscious perception. If subjects cannot perceive the prime stimulus, then they cannot strategically use it to respond. Experiment 4 used the same procedure as in prior experiments, but briefly presented the primes with forward and backward masks stimuli to degrade participants' conscious perception of the stimuli.
Method
Participants were 116 undergraduate students (53 male, 63 female; M age ϭ 18.89, SD age ϭ 1.08) who participated for partial This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
course credit. The data were collected using laboratory PC's separated into cubicles for privacy. On each trial, the hand of cards was shown for 600 ms, followed by a blank screen for 150 ms. Next, a premask word displayed for 100 ms, followed by a prime displayed for 12 ms, followed by a postmask word displayed for 100 ms. Finally, a blank screen was presented for 288 ms, and then participants were then asked to indicate whether they wanted to bet or pass by clicking one of two options with a computer mouse. The primes were gamble, wager, fold, and stay. Premask and postmask stimuli were six-letter words each drawn randomly from a list of 90 neutral words unrelated to gambling. Because masked priming generally has smaller effects than visibly presented priming (Kouider & Dehaene, 2007) , we wanted to increase the statistical power in this study. On the basis of the results of the previous studies, we limited the critical trials to hands 10 -15, and designated the lowest (Hands 4 through 9) and the highest (Hands 16 through 21) as filler trials in which the outcome was always win (for the high hands) or lose (for the low hands). On critical trials the outcome was randomly determined so that the reward experienced by participants was independent of the primes and hands. We increased the number of critical trials, resulting in 96 critical trials and 24 noncritical trials. The design of the study was 2 (prime: bet or pass) ϫ 6 (hand value) with both factors within-subjects.
Subjects completed an awareness test following the gambling task. Subjects were told that three words would be presented sequentially on each trial and that they should write them down. Each trial of the awareness check was identical to the gambling task, except that instead of choosing whether to bet, subjects were presented with three dialog boxes labeled first word, second word, and third word in which to type the words. They were instructed to type 99 if they did not see a word. Participants completed 16 trials, each of the four prime words was presented twice, and four neutral words (gander, wagon, fond, and stag) were each presented twice. These stimuli were matched in length and the first two letters to a prime word so that the words could not be guessed by seeing only the first letters. We scored the awareness check by counting the number of correctly identified prime words, irrespective of the order. Although the prime item was always the second word, we scored responses as correct if the presented prime was correctly identified even if it was listed as the first or third word.
Results
Awareness check. One participant correctly identified a single prime word. This subject was removed from the analyses to follow, although including this participants' data does not change any results. This low rate of detection suggests that the masking procedure was effective at disrupting conscious perception of the primes.
Primary results. Data were analyzed using the same repeated measures ANOVA as in previous studies. Figure 5 displays the proportion of bet decisions as a function of hand value and prime type. There was no main effect of Prime, F(1, 114) ϭ .08, p ϭ .78, p 2 ϭ .001. There was a main effect of Hand value, such that as hand value increased participants were more likely to bet, F(5, 570) ϭ 292.44, p Ͻ .001, p 2 ϭ .72. Replicating Experiments 1 through 3, the predicted interaction between prime and hand value was significant, F(5, 570) ϭ 5.36, p Ͻ .001, p 2 ϭ .05.
The pattern was the same as that observed in the previous experiments with visibly presented primes, although the main effect of the prime was smaller. If participants could not report the identity of the prime, it is unlikely that they strategically used it to inform their decisions. Althoughs this evidence increases our confidence that participants did not consciously use the primes, it is, of course, difficult to conclusively prove that this is the case. To provide converging evidence that our results are indeed driven by unintended influences of the primes in two final studies, we used a process dissociation approach to separate automatic and intentionally controlled use of the primes.
Method for Experiments 5 and 6: Separating Automatic and Controlled Influences
The first four experiments provided consistent evidence for replicable effects of primes on behavior. Although the data suggest that this effect was unintended, convergent results from a different method would increase confidence in that inference. To gain additional evidence about participants' ability to use primed information intentionally and unintentionally, we applied a process dissociation procedure in our final two replications (Jacoby, 1991) . This procedure was originally developed to separate conscious and unconscious influences of memory (Jacoby, 1991; . It has since been used in many studies to separate intentionally controlled and automatic (i.e., unintentional) influences in a variety of experimental paradigms, including the Stroop task (Lindsay & Jacoby, 1994) , priming tasks measuring implicit race bias (Payne, 2001; Payne & Bishara, 2009; Payne, Lambert, & Jacoby, 2002) , and decision-making tasks (Ferreira, Garcia-Marques, Sherman, & Sherman, 2006) .
The parameters of the procedure were the same as in Experiments 1 through 3. We modified the game to employ a two block design that allowed us to set intentional and unintentional influences in opposition, and in concert. One block (the primeexclusion condition), used the same instructions as in Experiments 1 through 3. Participants were told that the word presented before their behavioral decision was merely a distractor. The instructions stated the word is "not informative, so try not to let this word This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
influence your decision." In the other block (the prime-inclusion condition), participants were instead told that this word was an informative hint. The instructions stated the word is "a hint and is informative on more trials than not, so you may want to consider this word in your decision." Process dissociation procedure analyses. In our task, participants could be influenced by the prime either intentionally (e.g., by using the prime as a hint) or automatically (e.g., making prime-consistent responses despite trying to ignore the prime). Note that the model does not take the hand value into account when estimating automatic and controlled influences. Both estimates refer to using the primes-either automatically or intentionally. In the inclusion blocks, participants are encouraged to use the prime to guide responses. Therefore, prime-consistent responses might arise either through intentionally controlled use of the prime (C), or through automatic influences (A) even if controlled strategies fail (1-C). Equation 1 describes the expected probability of prime-consistent responses as a function of A and C processes in the inclusion blocks.
Alternatively, in the exclusion blocks, participants are instructed to ignore the primes. In this case, primes are expected to automatically influence responses (A) only when intentional control fails (1-C). Equation 2 describes the expected probability of primeconsistent responses as a function of A and C processes in the exclusion blocks. P (Prime-consistent responseԽExclusion) ϭ A* (1ϪC) (2) Given these equations and the probabilities of prime-consistent responses in each block type from the data, we can derive A and C estimates using Equations 3 and 4.
C ϭ P (Prime-consistent responseԽInclusion) Ϫ P (Prime-consistent responseԽExclusion)
A ϭ P (Prime-consistent responseԽExclusion) ⁄ (1ϪC)
Block order was randomly determined for each participant. Each block consisted of 40 critical trials (i.e., hand totals ranging from 8 to 17) and five filler trials. At the end of each block, participants learned how many points they had earned during that game. The point total was reset between the first and second block. Experiments 5 and 6 used identical 2 (prime: bet, pass) ϫ 10 (hand value) ϫ 2 (block type: inclusion, exclusion) designs, with all factors manipulated within-subjects.
Procedure. In Experiment 5, participants were 209 Amazon Mechanical Turk users (121 male, 88 female; M age ϭ 33.33 years, SD age ϭ 11.79). In Experiment 6, participants were 184 Amazon Mechanical Turk users (72 male, 112 female; M age ϭ 36.86 years, SD age ϭ 13.16). Five participants pressed one button throughout at least one block of trails and were excluded from the analyses.
Results
Analysis of betting responses. In Experiment 5, the Analysis of Variance revealed a significant three-way interaction between Prime, Hand value, and Block type (inclusion vs. exclusion), F(9, 1872) ϭ 3.95, p Ͻ .001, partial 2 ϭ .02. To probe this interaction, we examined the Prime ϫ Hand value interaction within each block type. For the prime-exclusion block, there was a main effect of prime such that participants were significantly more likely to bet when they were primed with bet (M ϭ .532, SE ϭ .014) than when they were primed with pass (M ϭ .504, SE ϭ .014), F(1, 208) ϭ 8.32, p ϭ .004, p 2 ϭ .04. There was also a main effect of hand value, such that as hand value increased, participants were more likely to bet, F(9, 1872) ϭ 210.97, p Ͻ .001, p 2 ϭ .50. Replicating the results of Experiments 1 through 4, these main effects were qualified by the predicted interaction between prime and hand value, F(9, 1872) ϭ 5.78, p Ͻ .001, p 2 ϭ .03. As seen in Figure  6 , primes affected responses primarily when hands were of a moderate value. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
For the prime-inclusion block, there was a large main effect of prime such that when subjects were primed with bet related words they were significantly more likely to bet (M ϭ .65, SE ϭ .016) than when they were primed with pass related words (M ϭ .44, SE ϭ .015), F(1, 208) ϭ 123.63, p Ͻ .001, p 2 ϭ .37. There was also a main effect of hand value such that as hand value increased participants were more likely to bet, F(9, 1872) ϭ 149.81, p Ͻ .001, p 2 ϭ .42. These main effects were qualified by an unexpected interaction between Prime and Hand value, F(9, 1872) ϭ 4.77, p Ͻ .001, p 2 ϭ .02, likely reflecting a ceiling effect in the inclusion block when the hand value was high and a betting related prime was presented. Critically, unlike the results in the exclusion condition, participants were significantly more likely to bet when they were primed with bet related words than pass related words at every hand value.
This pattern of results was replicated in Experiment 6. Again, there was a significant three-way interaction between Prime, Hand value, and Block type (inclusion vs. exclusion), F(9, 1602) ϭ 2.32, p ϭ .014, p 2 ϭ .01. For the prime-exclusion block, there was a main effect of Prime such that when participants were primed with bet related words they were significantly more likely to bet (M ϭ .49, SE ϭ .015) than when they were primed with pass related words (M ϭ .45, SE ϭ .014), F(1, 178) ϭ 12.59, p Ͻ .001, p 2 ϭ .07. There was also a main effect of Hand value such that as hand value increased participants were more likely to bet, F(9, 1602) ϭ 187.62, p Ͻ .001, p 2 ϭ .51. Again, these main effects were qualified by the predicted interaction between Prime and Hand value, F(9, 1602) ϭ 3.89, p Ͻ .001, p 2 ϭ .02. As shown in Figure  7 , prime-consistent responses were more common when hands were of a moderate value.
For the prime-inclusion block, there was a main effect of prime such that when people were primed with bet related words they were significantly more likely to bet (M ϭ .596, SED ϭ .018) than when they were primed with pass related words (M ϭ .427, SED ϭ .016), F(1, 178) ϭ 73.201, p Ͻ .001, p 2 ϭ .29. There was also a main effect of hand value such that as hand value increased participants were more likely to bet, F(9, 1602) ϭ 133.97, p Ͻ .001, p 2 ϭ .43. Again, these main effects were qualified by an interaction between prime and hand value, F(9, 1602) ϭ 2.79, p ϭ .003, p 2 ϭ .02, likely due to a ceiling effect at the highest values (see Figure 8) . As in Experiment 4, primes significantly affected responses at every hand value.
To compute A and C estimates, we aggregated the hand values into two sets: the ambiguous hands (Hands 11 through 14) and unambiguous hands (Hands 8 through 10 and 15 through 17). We estimated A and C parameters separately for each set using Equations 1 through 4.
In Experiment 5, as predicted, A estimates were significantly higher on ambiguous hands, M ϭ .61 (95% CI [.59, .64 09. An estimate of no automatic effects would be reflected by an A estimate of .50. As can be seen by the confidence intervals, the A estimates in both conditions were significantly greater than .50. Thus, the primes had significant automatic effects over all, and these effects were stronger on ambiguous than unambiguous hands.
Estimates of controlled responding reflect how much more the primes affected responses when subjects tried to use the primes than when they tried not to use the primes. C estimates were not different on ambiguous hands, M ϭ .09 (95% CI [.06, .12 The process dissociation results converge with the results of the previously reported studies. Participants were partially able to strategically use the primes when they believed they were helpful hints, and resist using the primes when they were uninformative. However, when control failed, the primes exerted an automatic influence, especially when the hand was more ambiguous. Together with the results of Experiments 1 through 4, this provides further evidence that the primes can induce an unintended influence on behavior.
Combined analysis. The overall pattern of priming effects was consistent across the six replications reported above. However, the significance levels at particular hand values varied somewhat across studies. This is unsurprising because there are few observations at each hand value. By aggregating results across the studies we can more precisely estimate the priming effect across the range of hand values. In the aggregate analysis we included data from Hand Values 10 through 15 because those values were present across all experiments. For Experiments 5 and 6 we used only data from the exclusion blocks. In this aggregate analysis it was not necessary to use meta-analytic summary statistics because all experiments used the same basic procedure and utilized identical dependent variables. In sum, this analysis includes data from 988 participants.
Across experiments, there was a significant main effect of prime, F(1, 987) Figure 8 , the data conforms to our predicted pattern of results, in which primes influence decisions more when hand values are moderate than when they are extreme. As expected, this resulted in a significant quadratic effect for the interaction term, F(1, 987) ϭ 21.63, p Ͻ .001, p 2 ϭ .02.
General Discussion
In 2012, Daniel Kahneman sent an open letter to a number of scientists, arguing that behavior priming was "the poster child for doubts about the integrity of psychological research" (Kahneman, 2012) . Since that letter, the replication failures cited above have led a number of individuals to conclude that reported priming effects were created by "cooked" experiments that were "guaranteed to find an effect" (Zwaan, 2013) , and only exist because of "confirmation bias, the use of questionable research practices, and selective reporting" (Wagenmakers, 2014) .
Here we provided evidence that primes can produce replicable effects on human behavior. Our procedure captured the defining elements of previous priming studies, in that ostensibly irrelevant primes influenced behavioral responses, and appeared to do so unintentionally. These studies used a within-subjects experimental design with high statistical power, which was created based on a priori theoretical predictions. We believe that these results provide important evidence for debates about the reality and replicability of priming phenomena. Whatever the reasons for particular replication failures, we find evidence that primes can reliably affect behavior when high powered methods are used.
This comparison between within-subjects and between-subjects designs raises an obvious question: In studies where failed null replications have been reported, is it the psychological effect of primes on behavior that is in question, or is it mundane methodological factors like statistical power? Our results suggest that methodological factors play an important role. If so, we may revise our beliefs about effect sizes and variability of previously reported effects, but not about the basic psychological effect in question.
Our results have implications for the fundamental theoretical perspectives that have been informed by priming experiments. Most broadly, the unintentional effects of primes on behavior support dual process theories that posit a role for automatic processes as well as consciously controlled processes in guiding human behavior (for reviews, see Gawronski & Payne, 2011; Sherman et al., 2014) . Even when individuals know that a particular stimulus is irrelevant for the task at hand, exposure to that stimulus can set processes in motion that bias our behavior in unintended ways.
This contrast between within-subjects and between-subject's designs has a historical parallel in research on implicit biases. Early influential studies used between-subjects designs to demonstrate that subtle exposure to racial stereotypes could influence social judgments (Devine, 1989; Lepore & Brown, 1997) . These studies provided "existence proofs" that stereotypes could have unintentional effects on judgments, but testing moderator variables in these designs required large factorial between-subject's designs. Research on implicit bias accelerated dramatically when later research developed within-subjects' designs that could provide robust measures of stereotype-priming on an individual level (e.g., Fazio et al., 1995; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) . As result, theoretical models of implicit attitudes became much more detailed and empirically better supported (e.g., Fazio, 1990; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; Petty & Briñol, 2006; see Petty, Fazio, & Briñol, 2012) .
Many questions remain. Our experiments differed from past priming studies in some ways beyond the within-subjects design. For example, the time between prime and response was only a few seconds in our studies. Past studies have often examined behavioral outcomes after several minutes, and the effects of primes may differ across time scales (Wentura & Rothermund, 2014) . One relevant study presented dollar signs as primes in a gambling task, Figure 8 . The proportion of "bet" decisions as a function of prime and hand value aggregated across all studies (N ϭ 988). Asterisks indicate where the contrast between bet and pass primes is significant, p Ͻ .05. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
and found that the primes increased betting when the decision was made immediately, but not after a 5-min delay (Gibson & Zielaskowski, 2013) . However, like most behavior priming studies, that study used a between-subjects priming manipulation and a single observation as the dependent variable. Results may be different when more powerful experimental designs are used. Future research should systematically vary potential moderating variables (including time) to better understand the conditions under which primes are more or less likely to affect behavior. Because the paradigm introduced here appears to produces a robust effect and can be easily implemented in both laboratory and online settings, it may provide a useful tool for researchers interested in investigating the moderators and mechanisms of priming. Our materials are available online at http://bkpayne.web.unc.edu/, and we encourage others to replicate our findings in their own laboratories. It is our hope that the paradigm will serve as a tool that helps us move beyond arguments about whether behavior priming is real, and return attention to important questions about how primes have their effects on human behavior.
